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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CENSORSIIIP OF SACRILEGIOUS MOVIES.
-Appellant's license to show the film "The Miracle" was revoked by
the Board of Regents on the statutory ground that it was sacrilegious.'
The Court of Appeals rejected appellant's contention that the statute
is unconstitutional as a prior restraint upon freedom of speech and
press.2 Upon appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed,
and held that the statute is unconstitutional as an abridgement of the
rights of free speech and press insofar as it permits a censor to ban
a film on the ground that it is sacrilegious. 3 Burstyn v. Wilson, 72
Sup. Ct. 777 (1952).
The constitutionality of motion picture censorship has been set-
tled since the Mutual Film decisions 4 of 1915 which laid down the
rule that motion pictures are ". . . not to be regarded . . . as part
of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion . . ." r
falling under the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.6 The Court was greatly influenced in arriving at this decision
1 N. Y. EDUCATIoN LAw § 122. "The director of the [motion picture]
division [shall examine every film] ... and unless such film or a part thereof
is obscene, indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character
that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime, shall issue
a license therefor." (emphasis added).
2 Burstyn v. Wilson, 303 N. Y. 242, 101 N. E. 2d 665 (1951). The Court
of Appeals also rejected, inter alia, appellant's contentions (1) that the word
"sacrilege" does not provide a sufficiently definite standard, and (2) that the
statute is unconstitutional because, in denying or revoking a license on account
of sacrilege, it interferes with religious liberty, and breaches the wall between
Church and State.
3 The Supreme Court, in reversing on the issue of free speech, found it
unnecessary, and therefore refused, to rule on appellant's contentions, supra
note 2, in keeping with their policy of not deciding constitutional questions un-
less absolutely necessary to do so.
4 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230
(1915); Mutual Film Co. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 247
(1915) ; see Mutual Film Corp. v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 248, 249 (1915).
Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230,
244 (1915). During the intervening four decades, our concepts of the freedom
from state regulation guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment have changed
radically. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925) ; Near v. Minnesota,
283 U. S. 697 (1931); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937); Adamson
v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947) (theory of the absorption of certain lib-
erties of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment developed and
limited).
6 RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 183 F. 2d 562 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U. S.
853 (1950); Mutual Film Corp. v. Chicago, 224 Fed. 101 (7th Cir. 1915);
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by its belief that, conceding motion pictures to be media of thought,
they are primarily spectacles conducted as ". .. a business pure and
simple, originated and conducted for profit." 7 Inasmuch as motion
pictures are of recent origin," the courts in the early part of this
century were neither aided nor hampered by a common law history
of the subject, except, perhaps, by analogy to decisional law involv-
ing censorship of the theater. Theater censorship, however, has
from the days of the Master of the Revels to the present been con-
sidered a valid exercise of the police power of the state, 9 and no re-
ported case involving its constitutionality has ever been decided by a
federal court. Since the instant case partially overrules the deter-
mination of the Mutual Film cases by including motion pictures in
the category of speech and press falling within the ambit of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, 10 the question again arises as to the
degree of immunity from regulation granted by those guarantees.
Although the criteria for determining the permissible limits of
state regulation of speech and press, as laid down by the Supreme
Court, have not gone without criticism and are believed by many to
be vague and confusing, 1 the Court has consistently held unconsti-
tutional any such infringement by means of prior restraints,' 2 nam-
ing censorship as one of the evils especially to be condemned.' 3  The
Pathe Exchange, Inc. v. Cobb, 202 App. Div. 450, 195 N. Y. Supp. 661 (3d
Dep't 1922), aff'd, 236 N. Y. 539, 142 N. E. 274 (1923) ; see cases collected
in Note, 64 A. L. R. 505 (1929).7 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, supra note 5 at
244. But cf. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 510 (1948).
8 See Kupferman and O'Brien, Motion Picture Censorship-The Memphis
Blues, 36 CoRN. L. Q. 273 (1951) ; Notes, 60 YALE L. J. 696 (1951), 39 COL.
L. REv. 1383 (1939).
9 In re Rudhlan Amusement Corp., 146 Misc. 308, 262 N. Y. Supp. 269(Sup. Ct. 1932); Commonwealth v. McGann, 213 Mass. 213, 100 N. E. 355(1913) ; see Note, 60 YALE L. J. 696, 703 n. 19 (1951).
10 72 Sup. Ct 777, 781 (1952).
'See Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 517 (1951) (concurring
opinion). After summarizing all the important free speech cases from Patter-
son v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454 (1907), Justice Frankfurter says: "I must
leave to others the ungrateful task of trying to reconcile all these decisions."
Id. at 539. Compare, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919), with
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496(1939), with Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941); Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943), with Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U. S. 622(1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948), with Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U. S. 77 (1949) ; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949), with Feiner
v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 (1951).
12 Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U. S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, supra note 11; Hague v. CIO, supra
note 11; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Accord: Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) ; 'Opelika v. Jones, 319 U. S. 103 (1943) ; Cant-
well v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) (freedom of religion). But cf.
Kovacs v. Cooper, supra note 11; Cox v. New Hampshire, supra note 11. For
a discussion of these cases, see Note, 25 ST. JoRN's L. Rtv. 295 (1951).13 See Gelling v. Texas, 72 Sup. Ct. 1002 (1952) (concurring opinion);
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Court in the instant case, however, limited its attack to the term
"sacrilegious" and left undecided the question of whether a state may
censor motion pictures under a clearly-drawn statute designed and
applied to prevent the showing of obscene films.1 4  The importance
of this decision, then, lies in its holding that ". . . the state has no
legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views dis-
tasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon
the expression of those views." 15
It would appear, nevertheless, that a state can prevent certain
limited classes of speech including ". . . the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words," to which
the Supreme Court has strongly asserted that the constitutional pro-
hibition against prior restraint is inapplicable."6
"Sacrilegious," as construed by the New York Court of Appeals
is synonymous with "blasphemous." '- In the words of the Supreme
Court, "[t]his construction fixes the meaning of the statute for this
case. The interpretation of the Court of Appeals puts these words
in the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legis-
lature." 's Blasphemy is a form of libel '" which the state has the
power to suppress for the same reason as any other libel, namely,
to prevent a breach of the peace.20
From the earliest times, blasphemy has been a crime indictable
Kovacs v. Cooper, supra note 11 at 82; Patterson v. Colorado, supra note 11
at 462.
14 See 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 782 (1952). But see Gelling v. Texas, supra note
13. In the concurring opinion, Justice Douglas wrote: "The evil of prior
restraint . . . is present here in flagrant form. If a board of censors can tell
the American people what it is in their best interests to see or to read or to
hear . . . then thought is regimented, authority substituted for liberty, and the
great purpose of the First Amendment to keep uncontrolled the freedom of
expression defeated." Ibid.
15 72 Sup. Ct. 777, 782 (1952).
16 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 572 (1942); Near
v. Minnesota, supra note 12 at 716; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451 (1938);
see 2 CooLEY's CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIoNs 886 (8th ed. 1927).
17 See 303 N. Y. 242, 258, 101 N. E. 2d 665, 672 (1951). Compare the
Court of Appeals' definition of "sacrilege" in the instant case with that of
"blasphemy" in People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N. Y. 1811). "The language
was blasphemous not only in a popular, but in a legal sense; for blasphemy,
according to the most precise definitions, consists in maliciously reviling God,
or religion, and this was reviling christianity through its author." Id. at 292.
See also 1 BouvrER, LAw DICTIONARY 369 (3d ed. 1914). "Blasphemy . . .
An impious or profane speaking of God or of sacred things; reproachful,
contemptuous, or irreverent words uttered impiously against God or religion."
IsSee Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 514 (1948), citing Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U. S. 69, 79 (1941), and Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 317(1926).
19 King v. Waddington, 1 B. & C. 26, 107 Eng. Rep. 11 (1822); King v.
Woolston, Fitz. 64, 94 Eng. Rep. 655 (1729).2o ODGERS, LAW OF LiBEr AND SL.ANDa 340 (2d ed. 1887).
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under the common law,21 and for many years was prosecuted under
the laws of this state.2 2 In addition, the Supreme Court has stated
by way of dicta that ". . . freedom of speech and of the press
does not permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or indecent
articles .. ,, 23 Moreover, less than one month prior to the de-
cision in the instant case, the Court held constitutional an Illinois
statute protecting ethnic groups from libelous and defamatory pub-
lications. 24  While it is true that in that case the Supreme Court
overcame the presumption of invalidity attaching to legislation limit-
ing free speech by a showing that the restraint was reasonable, in the
instant case there is no suggestion that the restraint was unreasonable
and hence the statute cannot be condemned on that ground.
Conceding that the law as it is presently enunciated by the Su-
preme Court precludes the enactment of prior restraints on speech
with the possible exception of those in relation to obscenity,2 5 it is
submitted that an interpretation which would preclude any prior re-
straint on blasphemy is foreign to the intentions of the framers of
the Constitution and wholly repugnant to the moral sense of the
American people. This nation is founded upon a belief and trust
in God. He is the ultimate sanction of our laws. We recognize
our dependence upon Him in our organic documents and utterances,
on our coins and through our public prayers. Our philosophy of
government is entirely consonant with a jealous respect for His Name
and Person. The enactment of group libel 28 and anti-defamation 27
21State v. Mockus, 120 Me. 84, 113 AtI. 39 (1921); Commonwealth v.
Kneeland, 20 Mass. (37 Pick.) 206 (1838); State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 553
(Del. 1837); People v. Ruggles, supra note 17; cf. Updegraph v. Common-
wealth, 11 S. & R. 394 (Pa. 1824) (conviction reversed because of fatal omis-
sion in the indictment) ; People v. Porter, 2 Park. Crim. Rep. 14 (N. Y. 1823)
(conviction reversed because based on uncorroborated evidence).
22 Common law crimes were abolished in New York in 1881. See N. Y.
PENAL LAW § 22.
23 See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281 (1897).
24 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725 (1952).
25 Matter of Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 280 App.
Div. 260, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 561 (3d Dep't 1952), recently upheld the banning
of the film "La Ronde" on the ground that it is obscene. The distributors
have indicated that they will ultimately appeal the decision to the United
States Supreme Court on the authority of the instant case. N. Y. Times, June
15, 1952, p. 68, col. 4.
28 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 24 (conviction for violation of
group libel statute affirmed). Pertinent parts of the applicable statute read:
"It shall be unlawful . . . to . . . exhibit in any public place in this state any
. . . moving picture . . . which . . . exposes the citizens of any . . . religion
to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the
peace or riots." Id. at 728.
27 There are at present some ten jurisdictions which maintain penal sanc-
tions against blasphemy: CoNN. REv. STAT. § 8566 (1949); DE.. REv. CoDE
§ 5250 (1935) ; IowA CODE § 728.1 (1950) ; Ma. REV. STAT. c. 121, § 33 (1944) ;
ANN. LAWs MASS. c. 272, § 36 (Michie, 1952) ; N. H. REv. LA ws c. 448, § 1
(1942); N. J. REv. STAT. § 2:165-2 (1937); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4523
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penal legislation may be practicable to protect individuals or groups
from libelous and insulting attacks upon their religious beliefs. When
applied to blasphemy of the Godhead, however, it is grossly inade-
quate. The statute in the instant case is a legitimate effort of the
duly-chosen officials of the State of New York to prevent the offen-
sive reviling of the Deity. It is respectfully submitted that such an
interest is paramount to the incidental dangers ordinarily inherent in
prior restraints upon speech.
A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - FREEDOm OF SPEECH AND GROUP
LIBEL.-Appellant, convicted of violating a statute' forbidding the
exhibition of lithographs portraying lack of virtue of a class of
citizens,2 contended that the statute contravened the Fourteenth
Amendment because it was vague and unlawfully abridged freedom
of speech and press. On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court, with four Justices dissenting, held that this state law pro-
scribing libels directed at a defined group is constitutional unless it
"is a wilful and purposeless restriction," and that this law, as con-
strued by the state court, provided an ascertainable standard of guilt.
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725 (1952).
Libelous utterances were criminal at common law 3 because of
their tendency to provoke a breach of the peace; 4 truth alone, there-
fore, was not a defense.5 As far as groups were concerned, however,
(Purdon, 1930) ; R. I. GEN. LAws c. 610, § 16 (1938) ; VT. REv. STAT. c. 371,
§ 8493 (1947).
1 ILL. REv. STAT. c. 38, § 471 (1951), which states: "It shall be unlawful
for any person . . . to . . . present or exhibit in any public place in this state
any lithograph . . . which publication or exhibition portrays depravity, crim-
inality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color,
creed or religion which said publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of
any race, color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which
is productive of breach of the peace or riots...."
2 The lithograph was framed as a petition, and the specific libel contained
therein was the following warning: "If persuasion and the need to prevent
the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then
the aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro,
SURFLY WILL." Beauharnais v. Illinois, 72 Sup. Ct. 725, 740 (1952)
(dissenting opinion).
3 See State v. Burnham, 9 N. H. 34, 38 (1837); Commonwealth v. Clap,
4 Mass. 163, 169 (1808); King v. Summers, 1 Lev. 139, 83 Eng. Rep. 337
(K. B. 1665).
4 Rex v. Saunders, T. Raym. 201, 83 Eng. Rep. 106 (K. B., 1670) ; see
State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266, 269 (1828).
5 Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825); 20 HALs-
BURY's LAws OF ENGLAND 384 (2d ed. 1936).
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